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Abstract
An overlapping generations model with the double innity of commodities and agents is the most
fundamental framework to introduce outside money into a static economic model. In this model,
competitive equilibria may not necessarily be Pareto-optimal. Although Samuelson (1958) emphasized
the role of at money as a certain kind of social contract, we cannot characterize it as a cooperative
game-theoretic solution like a core. In this paper, we obtained a nite replica core characterization of
Walrasian equilibrium allocations under non-negative wealth transfer and a core-limit characterization
of Samuelson's social contrivance of money. Preferences are not necessarily assumed to be ordered.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we generalize the Debreu-Scarf core limit theorem to a case with a double innity economy
that includes such typical examples as Samuelson consumption-loan models with money.
For standard nite general equilibrium settings, the Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto-optimal (the rst
fundamental theorem of welfare economics), and every Pareto-optimal allocation is an equilibrium allo-
cation relative to a price-wealth system (the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics). If we
strengthen the concept of Pareto-optimal allocation to a replica core allocation (an allocation whose replica
is a core allocation for each replica economy), we obtain an equivalence result where every replica core
allocation is a competitive allocation and every competitive allocation is a replica core allocation (Debreu
and Scarf 1963, Theorems 1 and 3). This equivalence theorem between the replica core and the competitive
equilibria is commonly known as the Debreu-Scarf core limit theorem.
In a double innity economy, competitive equilibrium (with or without money) is not necessarily Pareto-
optimal (Samuelson 1958), but it is known to be weakly Pareto-optimal (Esteban 1986 and Balasko and
Shell 1980). It is also known that every weakly Pareto-optimal allocation is an equilibrium allocation rel-
ative to a price-wealth system (Balasko and Shell 1980). Chae (1987), Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990)
and Chae and Esteban (1993) treat the core equivalence problem for Walrasian equilibrium allocations
in overlapping generations models. Their approaches, however, fail to treat competitive equilibrium al-
locations with money.1 Of course, an equilibrium with money (non-negative wealth transfers from the
government) is one critical issue that the overlapping generations model tries to describe.
In this paper, we show that if we strengthen the concept of weak Pareto-optimal allocation to replica
nite core allocation (an allocation whose replica is a certain kind of nite core allocation for each replica
economy 2), we obtain an equivalence result analogous to Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) where a replica
nite core allocation is a competitive allocation with non-negative wealth transfers and every competitive
allocation with non-negative wealth transfers is a replica nite core allocation.3
Our replica core equivalence approach (as well as that of Aliprantis and Burkinshaw 1990) has three
important advantages: by concentrating on the equivalence argument without using the equal treatment
property, (i) we can show a weak core theoretic equivalence result merely based on weak optimality
conditions, (ii) we obtain a limit theorem of the core instead of a theorem in the limit measure space like
Chae and Esteban, and (iii) we can allow for an argument based on non-ordered preferences, and hence
our result may also be considered a non-ordered extension of the Debreu-Scarf core equivalence theorem.4
1 Their concepts, such as the short-term core (Aliprantis and Burkinshaw 1990) and the short-run core (Chae 1987),
exclude equilibrium allocations with non-zero at money in two-period overlapping generations economies. For the short-
term core argument, as a simple one-good per period economy example pointed out in Esteban (1986), such a monetary
equilibrium is blocked by a coalition of all agents after a certain period without changing all but the rst nite members'
allocations. In the short-run core, we can also easily construct an example under which a typical Samuelson-type monetary
equilibrium allocation is always blocked by the t-generation for each t-economy for all t = 1; 2;   .
2 More precisely, this is an allocation, x, whose replica is a nite core allocation for each replica economy even when the
endowments of some members are replaced by the allocation, x, itself.
3 In this paper, we use \wealth transfer" instead of \monetary transfer" because these two concepts are dierent unless
we use the perfect-foresight assumption on the expectation for dynamics. In the sense of Esteban and Millan (1990), we
concentrate on the set of all monetary equilibrium allocations and competitive equilibrium allocations without money.
4 Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990), however, do not successfully treat non-ordered preference cases. In our model, a
strong sense of the local non-satiation in (E.3) plays an essential role in the proof of Theorem 1.
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2 The Model
Let N be the set of all positive integers and R be the set of real numbers. A pure exchange overlapping
generations economy, or more simply, an economy, E, is comprised of the following list:
(E.1) fItg1t=1: a countable family of mutually disjoint nite subsets of N such that
S1
t=1 It  N ,
and if It = ;, It+1 = ; for each t 2N . It is the index set of agents in generation t.
(E.2) fKtg1t=1: a countable family of non-empty nite intervals, Kt = fk(t); k(t)+1;    ; k(t)+`(t)g
where k(t) and `(t) are elements of N such that
S1
t=1Kt = N , k(t) < k(t + 1)5 k(t) + `(t) for all
t 2 N , and ft j n 2 Ktg is nite for each n 2 N . Kt is the index set of commodities available to
generation t.
(E.3) f(%i; !i)gi2St2N It : countably many agents, where %i is a reexive binary relation on com-
modity space for each generation RKt+ , representing a preference of i 2 It. We write xi i yi i
xi%i yi and yi%xi, and xi i yi i xi%i yi and xi 6 yi. Strict preference i is continuous (having
an open graph in RKt+ RKt+ ), strictly monotonic (xi= yi and xi 6= yi implies xi i yi), and has a
convex better set (fyij yi i xig is convex) at every xi such that !ii xi. The closure of the graph
of i in RKtRKt is the graph of %i (a strong sense of local non-satiation). The initial endowment
of i, !i, is an element of RKt++ = fx j x : Kt ! R++g for each i 2 It.
It is convenient to identify the commodity space for each generation RKt+ with a subset of R
N, which is
the set of all functions from N to R, by considering x 2 RKt+ a function that takes value 0 on N nKt.
Then we can dene the total commodity space for economy 1t=1RKt+ as the set of all nite sums among
the points in the commodity spaces of the generations. Clearly, 1t=1RKt+ can be identied with a subset
of direct sum R1, the set of all nite real sequences, which is a subspace of the set of all real sequences,
R1  RN with pointwise convergence topology.
Given an economy, E = (fItg1t=1; fKtg1t=1; f(%i; !i)gi2St2N It), the price space for E, P(E), is dened
as the set of all p in RN+ such that under the duality between R1 (with relative topology) and R
1 (with
pointwise convergence topology), p positively evaluates all the agents' initial endowments:
P(E) = fp 2 RN+ j p  !i > 0 for all i 2 It, for all t 2Ng:(1)
Since for all i 2 It, !i belongs to RKt++ for all t 2 N , the price space of E always includes RN++ for all E
in Econ, where Econ denotes the set of all economies satisfying conditions (E.1), (E.2) and (E.3).
For each E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ, sequence (xi 2 RKt)i2St2N It is called an allocation for
E. Allocation (xi 2 RKt)i2St2N It is said to be feasible ifX
t2N
X
i2It
xi5
X
t2N
X
i2It
!i;(2)
where the summability in RN of both sides of the inequality is assured by (E.2). The list of price
vector p 2 P(E), non-negative wealth transfer function ME :N =
S1
t=1 It ! R+, and feasible allocation
(xi 2 RKt)i2St2N It , is called a non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium for E, if for each t 2N
and i 2 It, xi is a i-maximal element in set fxi 2 RKt j p xi5 p !i+ME (i)g. Since the non-negative
wealth transfer is an abstraction of the money supply in perfect-foresight overlapping generations settings,
we denote the set of all non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium allocations byMWalras(E).
A coalition in economy E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ is a set of consumers S 
S1
t=1 It.
Allocation x for economy E is said to be blocked by coalition S if it is possible to nd commodity bundles
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x^i for all i 2 S such that Pi2S(x^i   !i) = 0 and x^i%i xi for all i 2 S, and x^i i xi for at least one i 2 S.
For each E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ, the set of all feasible allocations that cannot be blocked
by any coalition is said to be the core of economy E and is denoted by Core(E). Element x 2 Core(E) is
called a core allocation. The set of all feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by any nite coalition is
called the nite core of economy E and is denoted by Fcore(E). Element x 2 Fcore(E) is called a nite
core allocation for E.
3 Replica Core Equivalence Theorem
For each feasible allocation x = (xi 2 RKt)i2St2N It for E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ, we denote
by E(x) an economy where initial endowment allocation ! = (!i) is replaced by x = (xi).5 Hence, we
have E = E(!).
Consider the following replica economy,
Em(x) En(!);(3)
which consists of all the members of the m-fold replica economy of E(x) and the n-fold replica economy
of E(!) for each m 2 N and n 2 N . Let us denote by Cmn(E) the set of allocations x for E such that
the (m + n)-fold replica allocation of x belongs to Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)).6 Moreover, let us denote by
Cn(E) the set of allocations x for E such that the n-fold replica allocation of x belongs to Core(En). It
is easy to check that if x is a feasible allocation of E = E(!) such that (m + n)-fold replica allocation
of x does not belong to Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)), the replica allocation does not belong to Core(Em+n).7
Therefore, we can write Cmn(E)  Cm+n(E) for each m 2 N and n 2 N . It is also easy to check that
Cmn(E)  Cm0n0(E)     wherem0=m, n0=n.8 For nite economy E, the Debreu-Scarf limit theorem
can be restated as
T1
m+n=2C
m+n(E) =Walras(E). We see below (Theorem 1), T1n=1T1m=1 Cmn(E) =
MWalras(E). Hence, the restriction of Theorem 1 to the case with nite economy E provides the following
extension of the replica core version of the Debreu-Scarf limit theorem because there is no dierence in
our settings betweenWalras(E) andMWalras(E).
For nite economy E, feasible allocation x for E is a competitive equilibrium allocation i its
(m + n)-fold replica allocation belongs to Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)) for every suciently large
m 2N and n 2N . That is,Walras(E) = T1n=1T1m=1Cmn(E).
As above, concept Fcore gives a unied replica core equivalence characterization for all non-negative
wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Note that allocation x such that x 2 Fcore(E(x))
is the weak Pareto-optimal allocations in Balasko and Shell (1980). It is easy to check that the n-fold
replica allocation of x 2MWalras(E) belongs to Fcore(En(x)) for all n 2N and Fcore(En(!)) for all
5 In the following, we sometimes omit the subscript i 2 St2N It of an allocation for an economy as long as there is no risk
of confusion.
6 The (m+ n)-fold replica allocation of x is the allocation for Em(x)En(!) such that for each replica agent i in E(x) or
E(!), we assign the same allocation under x in economy E.
7 Clearly, the replica allocation, xm+n, is feasible for Em(x) En(!) and Em+n = Em+n(!). If xm+n =2 Fcore(Em(x)
En(!)), then there exists a nite coalition S in Em(x)  En(!) that blocks allocation xm+n. We can write S = S1 [ S2,
where S1 (resp.S2) consists of members in Em(x) (resp.En(!)). Then, coalition S consisting of all members of Em(x) and
S2 also blocks xm+n 2 Em(x) En(!). Therefore xm+n =2 Core(Em+n).
8 Note that the equal treatment property is not necessary for ensuring the above inclusion relations. Here we are following
the replica core equivalence approach in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990).
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n 2 N .9 But we have an example where the n-fold replica of allocation x, which is not an element of
MWalras(E), belongs to Fcore(En(x)) \Fcore(En(!)) for all n 2N .10
Theorem 1: Feasible allocation x for E is a non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium allocation
i its (m+n)-fold replica allocation belongs to Fcore(Em(x)En(!)) for every m 2N and n 2N . That
is,MWalras(E) = T1n=1T1m=1 Cmn(E).
Proof : [Suciency] Let x = (xi) be an element of MWalras(E) under price p and non-negative
wealth transfer function ME . Assume that S = S1 [ S2 is a nite coalition of Em(x)  En(!) for
some m and n in N blocking the (m + n)-fold replica allocation of x = (xi), where S1 is a coalition
in Em(x) and S2 is a coalition in En(!). Then, under (E.3), especially by using the strong sense of
local non-satiation, an allocation (xi)i2S for S exists such that
P
i2S x
i =
P
i2S1 x
i
 +
P
i2S2 !
i and
xi i xi for all i 2 S. Then we have p  xi > p  xi for all i 2 S. This implies, however, that
p  (Pi2S1 xi +Pi2S2 xi) > p Pi2S1 xi + p Pi2S2 xi= p  (Pi2S1 xi +Pi2S2 !i), a contradiction toP
i2S x
i =
P
i2S1 x
i
 +
P
i2S2 !
i.
[Necessity] Let x = (xi) be an allocation for E = (fItg1t=1; fKtg1t=1; (%i; !i)i2St2N It) such that every
(m + n)-fold replica allocation of x belongs to Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)) for all m and n in N . In this
proof, we denote by I(t) the set of all agents in generations from 1 to t,
St
s=1 Is, and by K(t) the set
of all commodities that are available for agents in I(t),
St
s=1Ks. Dene for each i 2 It, t 2 N ,  i as
 i = fizi1+(1 i)zi2 j !i+zi1 i xi; xi+zi2 i xi; 05i5 1g  RKt . Then, take the convex hull  (t) of
nite union
S
i2I(t)  i 
St
s=1R
Ks  RK(t) for each t 2N . Since, for every i,  i is non-empty and convex,
non-empty convex set  (t) consists of all vectors z that can be written as
P
i2I(t) 
i(izi1 + (1   i)zi2),
with i= 0,
P
i2I(t) 
i = 1, where zi1 + !
i i xi and zi2 + xi i xi for each i.
We will show in the similar way as in the proof of Debreu and Scarf (1963, Theorem 3) that  (t) does
not have 0 as its element for each t 2 N . Let us suppose that 0 belongs to  (t). Then, one can writeP
i2I(t) 
i(izi1+(1 i)zi2) = 0, with i= 0,
P
i2I(t) 
i = 1, and zi1+!
i i xi and zi2+ xi i xi for each
i. For each k suciently large, let ai1k and a
i
2k be the smallest integers greater than k
ii and ki(1 i)
respectively. Also, let I be the set of i 2 I(t) for which i > 0. For each i 2 I, we dene zi1k as k
ii
ai1k
zi1
and zi2k as
ki(1 i)
ai2k
zi2. Observe that z
i
1k + !
i belongs to the segment [!i; zi1 + !
i], zi2k + x
i belongs to
the segment [xi; zi2 + x
i].
I (i > 0; 05i5 1)
I1 (
i 6= 0)
I2 (1  i 6= 0)1  
i = 0
i = 0
Figure 1: The union of I1 and I2 is equals to I.
Let I1 be the set of i 2 I such that i 6= 0, and I2 be the set of i 2 I such that 1   i 6= 0. Note that
I1 [ I2 = I (see Figure 1). For i 2 I1, zi1k + !i tends to zi1 + !i, and for i 2 I2, zi2k + xi tends to zi2 + xi
9 To see this, in the proof of Theorem 1, [Suciency], let S1 or S2 be an empty set.
10 See Appendix.
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as k tends to innity. The continuity assumption on preferences implies that zi1k + !
i i xi for all i 2 I1
and zi2k + x
i i xi for all i 2 I2 for all k suciently large. Select one of such k. Then we have
0 = k
X
i2I
i(izi1 + (1  i)zi2) =
X
i2I
(ai1kz
i
1k + a
i
2kz
i
2k) =
X
i2I
ki(izi1 + (1  i)zi2)(4)
=
X
i2I1nI2
kiizi1 +
X
i2I1\I2
ki(izi1 + (1  i)zi2) +
X
i2I2nI1
ki(1  i)zi2
=
X
i2I1nI2
ai1kz
i
1k +
X
i2I1\I2
(ai1kz
i
1k + a
i
2kz
i
2k) +
X
i2I2nI1
ai2kz
i
2k
Let us consider the
 
(maxi2I ai1k) + (maxi2I a
i
2k)

-fold replica economy of E. Take the coalition composed
of ai1k replica members of i for each i 2 I1 to each one of whom we assign !i+zi1k, and ai2k replica members
of i for each i 2 I2 to each one of whom we assign xi2 + zi22k. This coalition blocks the allocation (xi) as
equation (4) and the fact that zi1k + !
i i xi for all i 2 I1 and zi2k + xi i xi for all i 2 I2 show. This
is a contradiction to the denition of Fcore(Em(x) En(!)). Hence, we have established that 0 does not
belong to the convex set  (t) for each t 2N .
Let (t)  R1 be the set of prices such that p z= 0 for all z 2  (t)  RK(t)  R1, which is non-empty
by the separating hyperplane theorem. (t) is closed in RK(t)  R     = R1. Moreover, under the
resource-related structure assured by (E.2) and !i  0 for all i, (t) is a subset of RK(t)++  R     
R1.11 Next, we will obtain p 2 Tt2N (t). From the denition of each  (t)  RK(t), we have
 (1)   (2)   (3)     in R1. Hence, we have (1)  (2)  (3)     in R1. Thus we seeTt
s=1 (s) = (t). For nite economy, we have (t) = (t + 1) =    for all suciently large t, hence the
result is obvious. If the number of agents is innite, for each t 2 N , choose price p(t) = (p1(t); p2(t);   )
in (t)  RK(t)++ R     R1 (see Figure 2).
qqq














RK(1)
RK(2)
RK(s 1)
RK(s)
p1(1) p2(1)   
p1(2) p2(2) p3(2) p4(2)   
p1(s  1) p2(s  1)   
p1(s) p2(s)   
| {z } | {z } | {z }
+ + +
p1 p

2 p

s
(1) sp(1)
(2) sp(2) qqq
(s  1) sp(s  1)
(s) sp(s) qqq
Figure 2: How to construct the limit price p.
11 Indeed, (t) is the set of supporting price vectors for the better set at xi under the strictly monotonic preference for
each i 2 I(t), where every xi is necessarily evaluated positively (at least as great as the value of !i).
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Let us dene for each t 2N , compact set K(t) = fqt j qt 2 RK(t); kqtk = 1g. Moreover, for each s; t 2N ,
s5 t, dene mapping hst : (t) ! K(s) as hst(p) = prK(s) pk prK(s) pk for each p 2 (t), where pr denotes the
projection.12 Since K(1) is compact, if t ! 1, h1t(p(t)) converges to a limit, p^1 2 K(1) \ h11((1)).
Then we take a subsequence, fp(t)gt2N(1), of fp(t)gt2N, where N(1) is a conal subset of N , such that
h1t(p(t)) converges to p^

1. Dene p

1 2 RK(1) as p1 = p^1. Next, since K(2) is compact, when t ! 1, by
taking a subsequence, fp(t)gt2N(2), of fp(t)gt2N(1), where N(2) is a conal subset of N(1) constructed
by elements greater than or equal to 2, h2t(p(t)) also has a limit p^

2 2 K(2) \ h22((2)). We dene
p2 2 RK(2)nK(1) as 1k prK(1) p^2k prK(2)nK(1) p^

2. Generally, from the compactness of 
K(s) for each s 2N , if
t!1, by taking a subsequence, fp(t)gt2N(s), of fp(t)gt2N(s 1), whereN(s) is a conal subset ofN(s 1)
constructed by elements greater than equal to s, hst(p(t)) has a limit p^

s 2 K(s) \ hss((s)). Hence we
can dene ps 2 RK(s)nK(s 1) as ps = 1k prK(1) p^sk prK(s)nK(s 1) p^

s. By repeating the above procedure, we
obtain p = (p1; p

2;   ). Since for each s 2 N , (p

1 ;;ps)
k(p1 ;;ps)k = p^

s is an element of hss((s)), p
 belongs to
h 1ss (p^

s) = (s), so we have p
 2 Tt2N (t).
Since xi i xi means that both xi !i and xi xi belong to  i, we have p xi= p !i and p xi= p xi.
By taking xi arbitrarily near to xi (from the local non-satiation property), we can see that p  xi= p !i.
Dene ME (i)= 0 as ME (i) = p  xi   p  !i for all i. Then, we have p  xi = p  !i +ME . In addition,
the condition of initial endowments !i  0 for all i, implies that p  !i > 0. Since xi i xi means that
p  xi= p  xi, the continuity of preference together with p  !i +ME (i) > 0 implies that for every i, xi
is an individual maxima under p and ME . 
As we mentioned before, Cmn(E)  Cm0n0(E)    , where m0=m, n0=n, and MWalras(E) =T1
n=1
T1
m=1 C
mn(E). Thus we obtained a replica nite-core limit equivalence theorem to the non-negative
wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium allocations, especially, the perfect-foresight monetary Walrasian
equilibrium allocations for overlapping generation economies. Note that in the above proof, we do not
assume preferences is to be ordered. Our equivalence theorem can also be utilized to axiomatically
characterize the price-wealth message mechanisms as Sonnenschein (1974), where the Debreu-Scarf limit
theorem plays an essential role in showing the category theoretic main result (see, Urai and Murakami
2015).
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Appendix
Let us consider overlapping generations economy E such that every agent lives for young and old two
periods, where there is one consumption good for each period, and every t generation consists of two
agents, it and i
0
t, for t = 1; 2;   . Each agent has initial endowment (2+ 2 ; 2 ), where  > 0 will be dened
in the following as suciently small.
Consider allocation x = (xi1 ; xi
0
1 ; xi2 ; xi
0
2 ;   ) such that xit = (0:1 + ; 0:1 + ) for all t = 1; 2;   ,
xi
0
1 = (3:9; 0:9) and xi
0
t = (2:9; 0:9) for all t = 2; 3;   . Clearly, x is feasible. Assuming that all the agents'
marginal rate of substitution at x is 1 (see Figure 3 for generations t= 2), we have p = (1; 1;   ) as the
supporting price for allocation x, which means that the replica allocation of x is weakly Pareto-optimal
for all replica economies: the n-fold replica allocation of x is an element of Fcore(En(x)) for all n 2 N .
Assume further that all agents' preferences are of the Cobb-Douglas type; their utility becomes arbitrarily
a small level when their consumption at one of their life time periods is near to 0. Then we can check that
the replica allocation of x is a nite core allocation for all replica economies: the n-fold replica allocation
of x is an element of Fcore(En(!)) for all n 2N .
Young
Old i3
0:1
0:1
21
(1,0.1)
0
%
ps
s
s
Young
Old i 03
2:9
0:9
0:8
3:920
%
ps
s s
(3.9,0.8)
Figure 3: MRS for each agent is 1. Parameter  > 0 for each allocation is neglected.
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For example, let uit(y1; y2) = y
0:5
1 y
0:5
2 for each t = 1; 2;   , ui
0
1(y1; y2) = (y1   3)0:5y0:52 when y1= 3,
ui
0
1(y1; y2) = y1   3 when 05 y15 3, ui0t(y1; y2) = (y1   2)0:5y0:52 when y1= 2 and ui
0
t(y1; y2) = y1   2
when 05 y15 2 for each t = 2; 3;   . Then, no nite coalition in En(!) can improve upon the n-fold
replica allocation of x. Any nite coalition among members in the rst generation fails to improve upon
(0:1 + ; 0:1 + ) as long as  < 10 3. Indeed, utility level of at least one of such coalition members, i,
should be less than or equal to ui

(2 + 2 ;

2 ) = (2 +

2 )
0:5 
2
0:5 under the maximality for utility allocation
with Cobb-Douglas type utility functions of homogeneity of degree 1. When  < 10 3, such coalition fails
to block any utility allocations greater than or equals to those under (0:1+ ; 0:1+ ), hence never improve
upon those under the n-times replica allocation of x. Suppose that the n-times replica allocation of x
cannot be improved upon by any nite coalition among members of generations from 1 to k  1. We show
in the following that any nite coalition, S, among members from 1 to k also fails to block the n-times
replica allocation of x. Let us denote S by S1[S2, where S1 is the set of members in generations from 1 to
k 1, and S2 is the set of members in generation k. Note that between S1 and S2, we have only to consider
two cases that there is a non-negative transfer of endowment commodity in period k from S2 to S1 or that
there is a positive transfer of it from S1 to S2. For the rst case, under the same discussion in the previous
paragraph, it is impossible to make utility levels of members of S2 greater than or equal to those under
(0:1 + ; 0:1 + ). For the second case, it would be possible to keep all utility levels of members of S1 as
good as those under x, but if so, by not doing such a positive endowment transfer, S1 can improve upon
the replica allocation of x, which contradicts the assumption. It follows that, by mathematical induction,
the n-fold replica allocation of x is an element of Fcore(En(!)).
Allocation x is not a non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium under p. (The wealth transfer
for type it agents should be negative.) The two-fold replica allocation of x does not belong toFcore(E1(x)
E1(!)) since, for example, i3 in E
1(!) and i03 in E
1(x) block the replica allocation of x with (1+ 2 ; 0:1+

2 )
for i3 and (3:9; 0:8) for i
0
3.
8
